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LAWYERS AND PSYCHIATRISTS IN THE COURT:
EDITOR'S FOREWORD
In the past two years, judicial and legislative action has begun
to bring Maryland into line with a national trend toward surrounding
involuntary civil commitment to mental institutions with certain protections. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
provided impetus for the change when, in Anderson v. Solomon,' it
refused to dismiss a claim that the Maryland commitment procedure,
recodified but not substantially modified in 1970, denied due process
by failing to provide for a hearing prior to or immediately after involuntary commitment. In 1971, the General Assembly provided for
mandatory review of every involuntary commitment by a specially
appointed official and for more scrupulous surveillance of patients'
rights, through the establishment of a mental health information and
review service in each appellate judicial circuit.' The latter move has
been viewed by its prime backer, State Senator Rosalie S. Abrams, as
an expression of a more significant shift in public policy toward
persons suspected of mental disorders than any taken since we
stopped viewing the treatment of mental illness as witchcraft. It
is the first recognition by Maryland law that commitment is not
simply a medical decision, but also a legal one involving the deprivation of the liberty of an individual, a step not to be taken
without all the protection afforded by due process of law.'
It appears, however, that full due process of law may not be the
ultimate prescription for the American system of confining persons
with mental disorders. New York adopted substantial changes in civil
1. 315 F. Supp. 1192 (D. Md. 1970).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 54 (Supp. 1971).
3. Abrams, Legislative Efforts to Reform Civil Commitment, 1 MD. L. FoRuM 12,
16 (Summer 1971).
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commitment procedures six years before Maryland's more modest
change. From the New York experience has come research that could
prove disheartening to those who have labored so long for change. In
Lawyers and Psychiatristsin the Court: Issues on Civil Commitment,
an attorney and a psychiatrist reveal that the patient who has the
benefit of counsel in a pre- or post-commitment hearing is not necessarily acquiring the services of an advocate, one apparent goal of
reform efforts, but may simply be able to take advantage of a set of
prejudices regarding his illness different from those of the examining
or committing psychiatrist. Psychiatrist Yorihiko Kumasaka and attorney Raj K. Gupta report that in civil commitment hearings, as in
determinations of criminal sanity, doctors and lawyers (including
judges) do not communicate. In cases in which even an untrained
layman or a patient's relative would agree with the decision to continue or to terminate hospitalization, the doctors and lawyers involved
find themselves in accord; in "difficult" cases, the presence of a lawyer
on the case may be of no practical significance to either the patient
or society.
The conclusions made manifest by the authors of Lawyers and
Psychiatrists in the Court have been suggested by authors of "traditional" law review works.' The Editors of the Maryland Law Review
found it significant that an empirical study, relying on actual transcripts of commitment review hearings, would so dramatically make
the same point. Although Maryland hb.. ostensibly avoided sortie
c f
the semantic traps in the New York legislation which formed the
basis of the study,5 no state can avoid the broader issues it raises.
4. See, e.g., Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 424 (1966); Morris, "Criminality" and the Right to
Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 784, 796 (1969); Schmideberg, The Promise of
Psychiatry: Hopes and Disillusionment, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 19 (1962).
5. The definitions of mental illness and mental disorder in the New York and
Maryland statutes [N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 2(8) (McKinney 1971) and MD.
ANN. CODE art. 59, § 3(g) (1972)] are substantially the same.
The Maryland statute expressly incorporates the word "functioning," which
seemed to give the professionals in the Kumasaka-Gupta study so much difficulty;
that word is not used in the New York statute. Neither statute makes "dangerousness"
an express condition of commitment. However, dangerousness has been made implicit
in most statutes permitting involuntary confinement for psychiatric treatment. Humphrey v. Cady, 40 U.S.L.W. 4324 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1972). The Supreme Court has
defined the word to encompass "the social and legal judgment that [the patient's]
potential for doing harm, to himself or to others, is great enough to justify such a
massive curtailment of liberty." Id. at 4325 (emphasis added).
The words "dangerousness" and "functioning" seem to play a role in involuntary civil commitment similar to that of "right and wrong" and "capacity" in criminal
sanity determinations.
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The difficulties that remain after one accepts the lack of communication between the professionals involved are stated in an Afterword by Irwin Brown who, while with the Legal Aid Bureau in
Baltimore, served as co-counsel for the plaintiff in Anderson v. Solomon, and had a major role in the drafting of the new sections of the
Maryland Mental Hygiene Law. Mr. Brown suggests that the ultimate
conclusion of the Kumasaka-Gupta study and of the other research
currently under way may be that involuntary civil commitment is
not a valid method for determining whether persons are to be confined to mental institutions. If this is so, a new role must be posited
for the attorney involved in a civil commitment proceeding.
Another possibility presents itself. "Dangerousness" and "functioning," the "magic words" in civil commitment proceedings, may
serve the same purpose as the concept of proximate cause, giving the
finder of fact leeway to do substantial justice within broad limits on
which there should be general agreement. The Supreme Court indicated its faith in such a flexible standard when it stated that, in
determining who should be confined for psychiatric treatment, "the
jury serves the critical function of introducing into the process a lay
judgment, reflecting values generally held in the community, concerning the kinds of potential harm that justify the State in confining a
person for compulsory treatment." 6 If the infusion of lay opinions
into the verdict is the function of the finder of fact, however, it seems
clear that the role of the patient's lawyer must be as advocate, not as
another lay participant.
The ultimate questions concerning civil commitment and the
attorney's role therein are not answered in the two selections that follow.
It is hoped, however, that because the questions are convincingly
posed, the research and the policy decisions necessary to make the
next important steps in treatment of the mentally ill will be forthcoming.
6. Humphrey v. Cady, 40 U.S.L.W. 4324, 4325 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1972); see
Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Skelly Wright, J., concurring).

